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COMMENT
STUDENTS UNDER SIEGE? CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS
CONCERNED WITH SCHOOL SAFETY
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: The principal at River City High
School receives a telephone call from an anonymous informant,
notifying her that he had observed a knife in "Jimmy's" backpack,
and indicated that he might also have access to a gun. The principal
recalls that Jimmy is the student who has dyed his hair blue and
who wanders the halls wearing a black trench coat and a T-shirt
that reads "School Sucks," in violation of the school district's dress
code. She checks Jimmy's file and discovers that he has been absent
on numerous occasions during the school year and has frequently
been disruptive in class. Upon learning this, she authorizes a search
of his school locker. Pursuant to the principal's order, a security
guard finds a large quantity of marijuana in Jimmy's backpack. The
principal calls the police. Jimmy is arrested, suspended from school,
and subjected to criminal prosecution. As it turns out, the informant
had never seen a knife in Jimmy's backpack. He just thought Jimmy
looked "creepy."
At Jimmy's criminal trial, his attorney moves to have the evidence
of marijuana suppressed, only to find that the exclusionary rule does
not apply in this context. Nor does it apply in the subsequent school
disciplinary hearing.
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Situations like this not only have become more prevalent due to
increasing instances of school violence caused by students,' but the
entire sequence of events-from the anonymous "tip," to the search,
to the admission of tainted evidence-is, in most cases, also consid-
ered constitutionally permissible. The proliferation of violence in our
schools has created a sense of emergency for our nation's school
districts.2 Schools have reacted by implementing mandatory dress
codes, searching students and seizing their property, installing
metal detectors, and enforcing stricter disciplinary policies.' Such
responses have inevitably resulted in a restriction of constitutional
rights for students.4
This comment explores the judicial reception of the constitutional
issues raised in attempts by schools to curb violence on campus,
focusing in particular on the courts' treatment of First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment claims involving student violence and
school prevention. Part II traces the First Amendment protection of
speech and expression as applied to school dress codes. The
evolution of dress code cases dealing with hair length, obscenity, and
gang clothing is likely indicative of how the courts will address the
legality of the current movement toward mandatory uniforms in the
public schools.
Part III discusses Fourth Amendment rights in the school setting.
Students' constitutional rights are not lost at school.5 Therefore, in
the educational environment, public school officials are not exempt
from the restrictions of the constitutional search and seizure
1. In 1994, the National School Boards Association estimated that approximately
135,000 guns are brought to the nation's 85,000 public schools every day. See William Celis
III, Schools Getting Tough on Guns in the Classroom, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 1994, at Al.
2. See, e.g., Chris Woodcock, Developing a Security Profile, AM. SCH. & UNIV., Dec. 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Magazine Stories, Combined File.
3. See Celis, supra note 1, at Al. Schools in Corpus Christi, Texas, for example, utilize
dogs to sniff for the presence of guns. See id. The fear of school violence, however, is not solely
limited to our larger cities. In Kings Mountain, North Carolina, a town of only 8500 people,
pupils used book bags to bring two pistols into the local middle school, prompting the school
district to ban the bags and employ metal detectors to search all its students, from
kindergarten to twelfth grade. See id. School officials also removed lockers at Sheldon High
School in Eugene, Oregon. See id.
4. See generally Philip T.K. Daniel, Violence and the Public Schools: Student Rights
Have Been Weighed in the Balance and Found Wanting, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 573 (1998).
5. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
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provisions.6 Part IV describes students' due process claims involving
alleged deprivations of property rights or liberty interests under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The comment concludes with an analysis
of the policy ramifications for both the school districts and the
students, and suggests that although schools have a duty to provide
a safe learning environment, they also have a duty to protect
students' civil liberties.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO APPEARANCE AND DRESS
REGULATIONS
The primary purpose of schools is to educate students.' Concerns
about violence and student safety, however, hinder school officials
from promoting an environment conducive to learning. Authorities
attribute much of the problem of violence to gang activity, where
gang members often distinguish themselves by particular clothing
styles and colors.8 In order to maintain harmony in the classroom,
many states and school districts have adopted dress codes that
prohibit students from wearing gang-related apparel at school.9
Although school officials have noted a decline in violence, thefts, and
gang activity due to these restrictions,' ° students have raised First
Amendment challenges to dress code requirements."
6. See New Jerseyv. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-35 (1985) (rejecting the state's argument
that the Fourth Amendment was only intended to prohibit searches and seizures carried out
by law enforcement officers).
7. See id. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring) ("T'he primary duty of school officials and
teachers, as the Court states, is the education and training of young people.").
8. See Dena M. Sarke, Note, Coed Naked Constitutional Law: The Benefits and Harms
of Uniform Dress Requirements in American Public Schools, 78 B.U. L. REV. 153,154 (1998)
(citing C. Ronald Huff & Kenneth S. Trump, Youth Violence and Gangs, School Safety
Initiatives in Urban and Suburban SchoolDistricts, 28 EDUC. &URB. SOC'Y 492, 492-93 (1996)
(stating that there are over 16,000 gangs in the United States whose more than half-million
members commit approximately 600,000 crimes per year, many of which take place in
schools)).
9. See id. (citing Shelli B. Rossman & Elaine Morley, Introduction to Safe Schools:
Policies and Practices, 28 EDUc. & URB. SOC'Y 395, 396, 403 (1996) (explaining that many
school officials believe flexibility in dress codes for pupils contributes to more incidences of
violence)).
10. See id. (citing William Modzeleski, Creating Safe Schools, Roles and Challenges, A
Federal Perspective, 28 EDUC. & URB. SOC'Y 412, 417 (1996) (depicting declines in fights, sex
and weapons offenses, assaults, batteries, and vandalism)).
11. See, e.g., Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556 (D.N.M. 1995); Jeglinv.
San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Olesen v. Board of Educ.,
676 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. IlM. 1987); Pyle v. School Comm. of S. Hadley, 667 N.E.2d 869 (Mass.
1996); Barber v. Colorado Indep. Sch. Dist., 901 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. 1995).
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A. Overview of the First Amendment
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech."' 2 This restriction on lawmak-
ing power is extended to state governments through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3 There have been several interpretations of the
meaning of the First Amendment. Supreme Court Justices Black
and Douglas supported the idea that the First Amendment right
speaks in absolute terms, as the amendment specifically states,
"Congress shall make no law." a The majority of the Supreme Court,
however, has never endorsed such an expansive view.'5 Rather, the
Court has applied varying tests to determine whether an individ-
ual's rights to free expression of his or her views are subordinate to
other interests of society.'6
To assist in determining First Amendment infringement, the
Court has created numerous categories of speech, based on the type
of regulation, the type of expression, and the site of the speech. 7
Based upon these categories, different tests are applied to establish
the scope of permissible restraints on that type of speech.'8 Thus, in
analyzing the constitutionality of public school dress codes, a trial
judge must first determine whether the regulated speech receives
protection, then examine the scope of that protection as it applies to
public school students.
Regulations that restrict speech may be either content-based or
content-neutral. Content-based regulations prohibit speech on the
basis of the ideas or information contained in the speech. 9 This type
of regulation will be sustained only if it is necessary to serve a
compelling governmental objective and is narrowly tailored to
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666 (1925) (holding that the First Amendment
is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
14. See Alison M. Barbarosh, Comment, Undressing the First Amendment in Public
Schools: Do Uniform Dress Codes Violate Students' First Amendment Rights?, 28 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 1415, 1424 (1995) (emphasis added).
15. See Wendy Mahling, Note, Secondhand Codes: An Analysis of the Constitutionality
of Dress Codes in the Public Schools, 80 MNN. L. REV. 715, 721 (1996) (citing JOHN E. NOWAK
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 866 (5th ed. 1995)).
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 722.
19. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-3, at 794 (2d ed. 1988).
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achieve that objective.20 Such regulations are presumptively
unconstitutional.2 '
Content-neutral regulations, on the other hand, are those that
limit speech without regard to the content or viewpoint of the
message conveyed.22 These regulations often interfere with speech
by regulating the time, place, and manner of speech.21 A content-
neutral regulation will be upheld as long as it promotes a significant
governmental interest that cannot be achieved by less restrictive
means. 24 The government need not choose the least restrictive
means of regulation,25 but it must not close alternative channels of
communication.26 Therefore, such regulations are subject to a much
lower level of judicial scrutiny than content-based regulations.
In addition to the regulation classifications, the Court has
recognized two different types of speech: "pure speech" and
"Symbolic speech." All speech that is classified as pure, such as the
written word or verbal forms of speech, receives some type of First
Amendment protection.28
Symbolic speech, in contrast, involves nonverbal conduct that is
intended to convey a message. This type of speech receives First
Amendment protection only after enduring judicial examination. 9
In assessing symbolic speech on constitutional grounds, courts
generally apply a two-part test that examines whether there was an
intent to convey a particular message and whether there was a
great likelihood that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it."0
The context in which the symbolic speech occurs is also a signifi-
cant factor in determining whether First Amendment protection
applies. In Texas v. Johnson,"' for example, the Supreme Court used
the two-part test from Spence to determine whether the defendant's
arrest for burning an American flag outside the Republican National
20. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
21. See R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
22. See TRIBE, supra note 19, § 12-23, at 977-78.
23. See id. § 12-23, at 980.
24. See id. § 12-24, at 992; see also United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
25. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
26. See TRIBE, supra note 19, § 12-24, at 992.
27. See id. § 12-2, at 792.
28. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,505-06 (1969).
29. See Mahling, supra note 15, at 723.
30. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
31. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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Convention violated the First Amendment.32 As part of its assess-
ment, the Court examined the context in which the conduct took
place.33 The Court found that the political climate and current
national events did, in fact, provide a backdrop for the defendant to
convey a particular message. 34 While the message may have been
interpreted differently by various groups, this did not place the
conduct outside the scope of protected symbolic speech.
Likewise, some lower courts have recognized that dress may
constitute symbolic speech. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has held
that buttons worn on students' lapels fall within the Constitution's
protection of symbolic speech.3 6 A Massachusetts state court
similarly found that a dress code prohibiting clothing with non-
vulgar, non-disruptive speech that "harassed" other students
impermissibly censored speech under the First Amendment.
Alternatively, other courts have held that dress is not sufficiently
communicative to constitute speech, 8 but that it may be protected
by a liberty interest in controlling one's own appearance.
B. Students' First Amendment Rights in Dress Code
Requirements
Due to the important and unique nature of the school setting, the
First Amendment affords less protection to public school children
32. See id. at 404.
33. See id. at 405-06.
34. See id. at 406.
35. See id. If the Court had found instead that the conduct did not constitute symbolic
speech, then the speech would not have received First Amendment protection.
36. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1992).
37. See Pyle v. School Comm., 667 N.E.2d 869, 870-71 (Mass. 1996).
38. See, e.g., Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 260 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding that hair
length "is not akin to pure speech" that contributes to the "storehouse of ideas," but is at most
"indicative of expressions of individuality"); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d
932, 937 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding that a public school regulation concerning "personal
appearance, style of clothing, or deportment" did not conflict with First Amendment
protections because the "students [who violated the regulation] were not purporting to say
anything"); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1970) (stating that First
Amendment protections were not triggered because the record did not establish that the
students disciplined for wearing their hair long chose this style to convey a message).
39. See East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838,841-42 (2d Cir. 1977)
(finding that there is a liberty interest in the right to control one's body, including one's hair
and dress).
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than to adults in other contexts.40 Although students are considered
"persons" under the Constitution and do retain some constitutional
rights to freedom of speech and expression while in public schools,
the Supreme Court has held that these rights are limited.4 As a
result, schools can censor speech that cannot be censored
elsewhere.42
The Court, however, has not given school districts unlimited
discretion in determining what types of speech are permissible in
schools.43 Public school administrators may not, for example,
prohibit speech simply because they dislike the message." The
ability of public schools to restrict student speech has been the
subject of varying interpretations in First Amendment appearance
and dress regulation jurisprudence, however, reflecting dramatic
shifts in constitutional theory.
1. Historical Attempts to Regulate Student Appearance
The historical view, as demonstrated by the 1923 case of Pugsley
v. Sellmeyer," is that courts will not question the reasonableness of
school rules pertaining to student conduct or appearance. In
Pugsley, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a rule that prohibited
"immodesty in dress."46 The court stated that it had other, more
important functions to perform than that of hearing discontented
students complain about school rules.47 The court added that respect
for authority and obedience are essential lessons to be taught in
school, and courts should be reluctant to substitute their judgment
for that of school officials.48
40. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985), for the proposition that students' constitutional rights "are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings"); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (explaining that the Court considers
students' First Amendment rights in relation to the special circumstances of the educational
environment).
41. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
42. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
43. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
44. See Board ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-72 (1982).
45. 250 S.W. 538 (Ark. 1923).
46. Id. at 540.
47. See id. at 539.
48. See id. In reviewing the rule at issue, the court stated that the rule was reasonable
in all respects because it aided in the discipline of the school. See id. at 539-40.
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Like Pugsley, other regulations of appearance, such as hair length
requirements, were traditionally upheld without much inquiry into
the educational need to keep hair short. For example, in Leonard v.
School Committee ofAttleboro,49 a school regulation barring students
with "extreme haircuts" from attending classes was upheld as
reasonable.50 The court determined that school officials have broad
discretion in implementing rules that affect student conduct and
classroom behavior, and are charged with a duty to protect the
general welfare of the school.5' The fact that the plaintiff was an
excellent student and well-behaved was irrelevant, in the court's
view, because his haircut was a "conspicuous departure[ I from
accepted customs."52 As such, it violated a rule that was reasonably
related to preventing disruptions and maintaining order.53
The deference given to schools regarding the regulation of
appearance has given way, however, to a willingness of courts to
examine closely the reasoning behind rules governing students'
attire to determine if there is a legitimate educational goal being
promoted.54 By the late 1960s, school authorities were required to
demonstrate that any regulation prohibiting expression was
promulgated to prevent a material and substantial disruption of the
educational environment.55
2. The Tinker Coup d'Etat
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District56
was a landmark case in establishing the boundaries of students'
freedom of expression. In Tinker, three students were suspended for
wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War.5 7
The Court determined that the students' conduct was "closely akin
to 'pure speech,"' and, therefore, was protected by the First Amend-
ment.5" The Court explained that it would sustain a regulation
limiting students' speech if the conduct invaded the rights of other
49. 212 N.E.2d 468 (Mass. 1965).
50. See id. at 473.
51. See id. at 472.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
55. See id.
56. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
57. See id. at 504.
58. Id. at 505-06.
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students,59 or "materially and substantially interfere[d] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school.'"6 ° In other words, the Court ruled that school officials must
provide a constitutionally valid reason for any regulation that
curtails students' speech.6 The Court then determined that the
school authorities could not have reasonably concluded that black
armbands would disturb school activities,62 firmly demonstrating
that students have First Amendment rights that are worthy of
protection, even in the public school setting.
3. Modern Regulations of Dress and Appearance Aimed at
Alleviating School Safety Concerns
Other cases seem to offer much less protection of student rights
to freedom of expression than did Tinker. Most recently, the
Supreme Court has endorsed an inculcative theory of public school
education. In other words, schools exist to impart school-sponsored
knowledge and ideals.6" School officials may therefore prohibit
expression that is disruptive or inconsistent with their educational
mission.65 As a result, in several instances, courts have found that
First Amendment protection does not apply to restrictions that do
not affect political speech or a student's access to information in
upholding regulations that affect dress or appearance.
In Gano v. School District,6" for example, the district court held
that the expressive message of a T-shirt depicting school officials in
a drunken state was unclear, and therefore not eligible for protec-
tion. The court explained that even if it had believed that the T-
59. See id. at 513.
60. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
61. See id. at 511.
62. See id. at 514.
63. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (arguing that courts have
adopted the view that the work of the public schools is the inculcation of values).
64. See id. ("The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.").
65. See id. at 685; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)
(holding that school authorities "do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities
so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns").
66. 674 F. Supp. 796 (D. Idaho 1987).
67. See id. at 798.
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shirts were expressive, the representation of school administrators
as drunk was unworthy of First Amendment protection.68
Similarly, in Bivens v. Albuquerque Public Schools, 9 a school
dress provision prohibiting sagging pants was upheld because the
district court found that the clothing style of sagging pants did not
constitute expressive speech.7° The plaintiff argued that wearing
sagging pants expressed his urban black identity.7 The court,
however, found that wearing sagging pants could be interpreted in
several ways. For example, it could signify gang affiliation or it
could simply represent a growing fashion trend among adolescents
across the country.72 Therefore, the plaintiff did not send a particu-
larized message that would be clearly understood by others.73
Courts additionally appear willing to defer to school authorities'
legitimate interests in preventing gang activity in the schools. In
Olesen v. Board ofEducation,74 a high school student challenged the
constitutionality of a school anti-gang rule prohibiting male
students from wearing earrings.75 The student argued that the
school regulation violated his right of free speech and expression
under the First Amendment.7" Holding that the school's policy did
not unconstitutionally infringe on his "freedom to choose his own
appearance," the district court focused on the school's concern for its
students' safety.77 The court further determined that the student's
"message" was one of individuality, and thus did not fall within the
protection of the First Amendment.78
Alternatively, in Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified School District,79
a California district court held that a ban on wearing clothing
identifying any collegiate or professional sports team violated the
free speech rights of elementary and middle school students. 0 The
68. See id. (deciding that to permit the shirt to be worn would compromise the
administrators' authority).
69. 899 F. Supp. 556 (D.N.M. 1995).
70. See id. at 560.
71. See id. at 561.
72. See id. at 560-61.
73. See id. at 561.
74. 676 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
75. See id. at 821.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 823.
78. See id. at 822.
79. 827 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
80. See id. at 1462. The court did, however, uphold the regulation as it applied to high
school students. See id.
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school district adopted the regulation because it was concerned that
sports-oriented clothing expressed association with gangs.81
Applying the standard originally established in Tinker, the court
concluded that there was no threatened disruption or interference
of school activities because the school district could not prove any
significant presence of gang activity in the schools. 2 Thus, it is
evident that a school must show an actual need for the restriction,
and not simply a preventative one.
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS OF UNREASONABLE SCHOOL
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
In addition to instituting dress code regulations, a school may also
search students and their belongings for evidence of weapons, drugs,
or other contraband as a means of preventing school violence. As
school dress codes often give rise to First Amendment challenges,
disputes about a school's authority to search and seize frequently
arise among students and school officials. The central issue of these
claims, however, is whether such school-based searches or seizures
violate the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment provides in part: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ... ."3 The Framers'
intent is said to have been two-fold: to protect an individual's
reasonable expectations of privacy, 4 and to protect "against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." 5 The Amendment
does not apply to acts by private actors, but, like the First Amend-
ment, is enforceable against the states, and hence their educational
agencies, through the Fourteenth Amendment.8
Because school-aged children are obligated to attend school, the
nation's school districts assume a duty to protect them while at
school. In fact, given the increased violence and drug use in schools
81. See id.
82. See id. at 1461-62.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
84. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
85. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
86. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
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today, school officials may be remiss if they do not search for and
seize objects that might pose a threat to the well-being of other
students or of school officials. The problem then becomes how to
balance the state's interest in maintaining a safe learning environ-
ment with the student's interest in personal privacy.
A. The Fourth Amendment in a School Setting
The Supreme Court announced for the first time in 1985, in New
Jersey v. T.L.O., v that the Fourth Amendment protects the rights
of public school students against searches or seizures by school
officials,8" and that even a limited search constitutes an invasion of
privacy. 9 The Court noted, however, that a warrantless search of a
student by school authorities is constitutional if reasonably justified
at its inception and if related in scope to the circumstances that
originally justified the interference.9" In T.L. 0., a teacher discovered
two students smoking in a school restroom in violation of a school
rule, and reported the incident to an assistant principal.9 ' One
student admitted to smoking; the other denied it.92 The assistant
principal searched the second student's purse and found both
cigarettes and cigarette rolling paper. 93 A further search produced
marijuana and revealed additional drug paraphernalia and evidence
of drug trafficking.94 At the suppression hearing, the student
claimed that the search was a violation of her Fourth Amendment
rights because the school administrator did not have probable cause
or a warrant, as is prescribed by the Constitution.95
Ultimately, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment applies
in the school setting, as school officials are government officials, not
private citizens, when they conduct searches of their students.96 The
Court held, however, that a less stringent test is applicable to these
searches than to searches by law enforcement officers.97 The police
87. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
88. See id. at 333.
89. See id. at 337-38; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1967).
90. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41.
91. See id. at 328.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 329.
96. See id. at 335-36.
97. See id. at 341.
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search is governed by the "probable cause" standard,9" while a
search by school officials is controlled by the lesser "reasonable
suspicion" standard, which accommodates the school's substantial
need to maintain order and preserve a proper educational environ-
ment.99 In other words, if a school official reasonably suspects,
through articulated facts, that a student has violated or is violating
the law or the rules of the school, a reasonable search may be
conducted to determine whether proof of such a violation is
present.' The search must be reasonable, and may not be exces-
sively intrusive in light of the age and experience of the student and
the nature of the alleged infraction.'' Specifically, reasonable
grounds must exist at the time of the search, and the scope of the
search must be reasonably related to its objectives.' 2 Thus, in
T.L.O., the reporting of the incident by the teacher to the assistant
principal represented the reasonable suspicion for searching the
student's purse for cigarettes.0 3 Then, the sight of the rolling papers
raised more reasonable suspicion, which supported the additional
search for drugs. 04 The evidence recovered from the search,
considering the totality of the surrounding circumstances, was
deemed by the Court to have been properly obtained.' 5
The Court in T.L.O., however, expressly refused to decide four
unresolved issues that it was not required to consider: (1) whether
the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for violations of the
Fourth Amendment by school officials;0 6 (2) whether a student has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in "lockers, desks, or other
school property provided for the storage of school supplies," and
whether the rules governing searches of these areas are different;0 7
(3) what is the "appropriate standard for assessing the legality of
searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the
behest of law enforcement agencies;"' ° and (4) "whether individual-
98. See id. at 340; see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-66 (1968).
99. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
100. See id. at 341-42.
101. See id. at 342.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 345-46.
104. See id. at 347.
105. See id. at 343.
106. See id. at 333 n.3.
107. Id. at 337 n.5.
108. Id. at 341 n.7.
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ized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness Stan-
dard" required for school searches."°9
B. Reasonable Suspicion
As evidenced in T.L.O., reasonable suspicion depends on the
unique circumstances involved."' It merely requires "reason and
common sense,"" and permits a "common-sense conclusio [n] about
human behavior' upon which 'practical people'-including govern-
ment officials-are entitled to rely.""2 Absolute certainty is not
required, because "'sufficient probability, not certainty, is the
touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.""' 3
Although the Court asserted that states can apply more demanding
standards under their own statutes or constitutions," 4 the Fourth
Amendment would be violated if school officials only possessed an
"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch."' 5
This reasonableness standard applies no less in a school environ-
ment when violent activity is suspected by school officials than
when, as in T.L.O., a school rule is known to have been broken. In
United States v. White,"6 for example, school officials suspected
gang membership when four non-students entered school grounds." 7
The police, upon being called to the scene, conducted a search based
on an informant's tip."' The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit ruled that the reasonableness of a search must be reviewed
in light of the totality of the circumstances, "which includes 'the
officers' experience and knowledge, the characteristics of persons
engaged in illegal activities, and the behavior of the suspects. ""'
The court noted that the tip, gang clothing, suspicion of gang
association among the suspects, and relevant criminal conduct
involving the suspects were all components of reasonable suspicion
109. Id. at 342 n.8.
110. See id. at 341-42.
111. Id. at 343.
112. Id. at 346 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
113. Id. (quoting Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)).
114. See id. at 343 n.10.
115. Id. at 346 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
116. No. 94-2575, 1995 WL 62887 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 1995).
117. See id. at *1.
118. See id.
119. Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Sterling, 909 F.2d 1078, 1083-84 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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justifying a search.12 ° The court also held that while gang member-
ship alone carries some weight in the totality of circumstances,
courts will more often rely on gang membership when the gang has
been connected to some suspected criminal or school rule-breaking
activity.
121
The reasonableness standard articulated in T.L.O. applies not
only to school searches, but to seizures as well. In Edwards v.
Rees,122 a junior high school vice principal interrogated a student
based upon a tip about a bomb threat."23 The student claimed he was
illegally seized and taken to the school office. 24 The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the seizure was justified at
its inception, as two students implicated the defendant, and he
never refuted those allegations. 25 This led the principal to believe
that questioning the subject would reveal evidence that he had
broken either the law or a school rule. 26 In fact, the court stated
that the magnitude of the suspected offense justified detaining and
questioning the student to uncover information regarding the bomb
threat. 2 ' Accordingly, seizure of the student by school personnel
was reasonable in light of the threat to the health, safety, and
welfare of the other students and staff.
As the previous two cases indicate, many Fourth Amendment
school claims involve the use of informants. The existence of student
informants, however, does not invalidate the application of the
T.L.O. two-prong test. The involvement of other students in the
incidents leading to the questionable search does not make the
search unreasonable. 28 In this instance, the school official conduct-
ing the search must have personal knowledge of the searched
student's conduct, or have reliable reports that such conduct would
give rise to reasonable suspicion of a violation of the law or of a
120. See id. at *6.
121. See id. at *5.
122. 883 F.2d 882 (10th Cir. 1989).
123. See id. at 883.
124. See id. at 884.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See, for example, Berry u. State, 561 N.E.2d 832, 834-35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), where
a teacher overheard an argument between students, one accusing the other of drug-dealing,
and proceeded to search one student's jacket. The search was held to be reasonable. See id.
at 837.
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school rule.1 29 If the student informant is known to the official as
likely to render reliable information, no independent corroborating
evidence is required before conducting the search. 3 However, if the
informant is anonymous to school personnel or is unreliable, further
investigation may be needed before a search is authorized. More-
over, if the report is made out of malice or other improper motive,
it should be considered unreliable and school officials must continue
to investigate before a search may be performed.' 3 '
Under the T.L.O. standard, school personnel have a great deal of
discretion in conducting searches. Teachers and administrators need
not become experts in Fourth Amendment search and seizure law,
however.'32 All that is required is that their actions be justified at
the time of the search and be reasonably related to preserving
order.'z
Despite this lower threshold, T.L. 0. gives school officials no more
power to invade the rights and interests of students than is
necessary.' Suspicion of possession of weapons, for example,
probably only permits a limited weapons search. Accordingly, in T.J.
v. State,"5 a Florida court held that an overly thorough search of a
student's purse, which revealed a bag of cocaine, was too excessive
when only a knife was sought.'36 The court noted that although the
search for the knife might have been justified, in this particular
case, the search was merely a "scavenger hunt," as there was no
indication that the plastic bag found in the purse pocket contained
a weapon.'37 Therefore, the court suppressed the drug evidence.'38
Likewise, the more intrusive the search, the greater the burden
is on school officials to justify a search as reasonable. In Cales v.
Howell Public Schools,'39 a strip search for drugs was held invalid
when a student's only suspicious behavior was ducking behind a car
129. See In re Appeal in Pima County Juv. Action No. 80484-1,733 P.2d 316,317-18 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1987).
130. See Bahr v. Jenkins, 539 F. Supp. 483,488 (E.D. Ky. 1982); People v. Singletary, 333
N.E.2d 369, 370 (N.Y. 1975); State v. Slattery, 787 P.2d 932, 934 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
131. See Florida v. J.L., 2000 WL 309131, at *3 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2000); Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990).
132. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 343-44.
135. 538 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
136. See id. at 1321-22.
137. Id. at 1322.
138. See id. at 1320.
139. 635 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
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in the school parking lot and giving a false name to the school
security guard while she should have been in class.140 The court
observed that the student's conduct "created reasonable grounds for
suspecting that some school rule or law had been violated," but it
did not create a reasonable suspicion that she possessed drugs
sufficient enough to justify the search. 41
C. Individualized Suspicion
Students accused of violent acts may also raise concerns about
"individualized" or "particularized" suspicion, an issue that the
T.L.O. Court specifically declined to address. Individualized
suspicion exists when the school official conducting the search has
evidence of a particular student's violation of the law or a school
rule. Generally, some level of individualized suspicion is necessary
for a search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 42 Strip
searches, like the one in Cales, clearly require it. 143 Thus, where
individualized suspicion is lacking, a search will generally be
unreasonable.'" As with all generalizations, however, there are
exceptions.
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 45 the Court addressed
an issue it had left unanswered in T.L.O.; that is, under what
circumstances can a search be reasonable, absent individualized
suspicion? In Vernonia, the Court held that random urinalysis drug
testing of student-athletes was constitutional under the Fourth
140. See id. at 455.
141. Id. at 457. The court refused to
read TLO so broadly as to allow a school administrator the right to search a
student because that student acts in such a way so as to create a reasonable
suspicion that the student has violated some rule or law. Rather, the burden is
on the administrator to establish that the student's conduct is such that it
creates a reasonable suspicion that a specific rule or law has been violated and
that a search could reasonably be expected to produce evidence of that violation.
Id.
142. See, e.g., In re Doe, 887 P.2d 645, 655 (Haw. 1994) (holding that individualized
suspicion is constitutionally required for Fourth Amendment purposes).
143. See Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1320-21 (7th
Cir. 1993); Tartar v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 982-83 (6th Cir. 1984); Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d
91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980).
144. See, e.g., Bellnierv. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47,54 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that searches
of public elementary school students by school officials are unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment where individualized suspicion is not present); see also Burnham v. West, 681
F. Supp. 1160, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1987).
145. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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Amendment, even though individualized suspicion was not
present. 46 The Court noted that public school students, in general,
are routinely subjected to various physical examinations and
vaccinations, and, therefore, should have a lower expectation of
privacy with regard to medical examinations and procedures.1 47
Furthermore, student-athletes possess even less of an expectation
of privacy, as they are accustomed to changing clothes and shower-
ing in common areas, and voluntarily subject themselves to a higher
level of regulation by choosing to participate in sports. 48 The Court,
therefore, ruled that the student athletes' minimal privacy interests
were outweighed by the compelling state interest in eliminating
student drug use and the need for immediacy in solving this crisis. 49
The Court did caution, however, that random, suspicionless drug
testing in contexts outside of the public school setting could pose
constitutional difficulties. 5 0
Increased concern for the safety of students and staff may also
legitimize group searches of broader student populations. In
Thompson v. Carthage School District,'' for example, the Eighth
Circuit upheld a group search of all male students in grades six
through twelve that was conducted due to a report that a student
had concealed a knife. 52 Although no weapon was recovered, school
officials found one student in possession of crack cocaine. 15 The
court noted that individualized suspicion is not always required for
school searches, 54 and reasoned that the search was "minimally
intrusive" and, therefore, constitutionally valid.'55
In DesRoches v. Caprio,56 a student in an art class was suspected
of stealing a pair of shoes.'57 Members of the class were asked if they
objected to a search of their backpacks; those who refused were
threatened with a ten-day suspension. 5 8 The search of the entire
class was carried out except for one objecting student, who was
146. See id. at 664-65.
147. See id. at 656-57
148. See id. at 657.
149. See id. at 661-63.
150. See id. at 665.
151. 87 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 1996).
152. See id. at 980.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 982.
155. Id. at 983.
156. 156 F.3d 571 (4th Cir. 1998).
157. See id. at 573.
158. See id.
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summarily suspended. 5 9 The student filed a civil rights action,
alleging a violation of his right to be free from an unreasonable
search. 6 ° The district court ruled in the student's favor, observing
that: "[T]his case does not present an extraordinary situation in
which the school's interest was sufficiently substantial or compel-
ling; a stolen pair of tennis shoes simply does not present exigent
circumstances or a future danger to other students."'6 ' The court
found that the school lacked the requisite individualized suspicion
to carry out a search and that the student was justified in refusing
to cooperate with school authorities. 2
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, however,
stating that the search was reasonable because the school officials
had individualized suspicion to search the student in question based
on the failure to find the shoes in consensual searches of the rest of
the class.'63 Viewing the situation from the time of the student's
first refusal, rather than from the time school officials first an-
nounced their intent to search the class, the court found the search
to be constitutional," even though it might not have been "justified
at its inception."'65
D. Students'Expectations of Privacy
The issue of student privacy is also a core consideration in any
application of search and seizure law in public schools. The Fourth
Amendment does not protect all expectations of privacy, but rather
only those that are reasonable or legitimate. 166 Therefore, Fourth
Amendment challenges to the actions of school officials must be
further assessed on the basis of whether the particular search in
question encroached upon a student's legitimate expectation of
privacy.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. DesRoches v. Caprio, 974 F. Supp. 542, 549 (E.D. Va. 1997), rev'd, 156 F.3d 571(4th
Cir. 1998).
162. See id. at 549-50.
163. See DesRoches, 156 F.3d at 577-78.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 577.
166. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The Fourth Amendment's
protection of people, rather than policies, is legitimate. See id.
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In the context of school searches, courts are split as to when a
legitimate expectation of privacy is present and where it applies. For
example, the Fifth Circuit, in Horton v. Goose Creek Independent
School District,'67 held that although students do have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the airspace surrounding their persons,
they do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the airspace
around their lockers or automobiles.'68 Horton involved the constitu-
tionality of canine drug sniffs of students, their lockers, and their
automobiles. 6 9 The court invalidated the sniff searches of the
individual students and stressed that the canine sniffing occurred
in close proximity to the students' bodies, an area that is "certainly
. . . not the subject of lowered expectations of privacy. ""' The
students' lockers and cars, however, were inanimate objects located
in public view to which the students' expectations of privacy were
minimal.'' Accordingly, the sniff searches of these areas were
upheld. 172
Alternatively, in Burnham v. West,'73 a district court ruled that
students do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
airspace surrounding their persons. 74 In this case, the court found
that when a teacher sniffed a student's hand to detect whether the
odor of marijuana was present, a search had not occurred. 175
Additionally, several courts have held that students have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their lockers.' 6 The court in In
re Dumas177 explained that, because students store personal and
intimate items in their lockers, they have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in their lockers. 78 Two judges concurred in the decision,
revealing that the record did not indicate that the school had placed
167. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
168. See id. at 477-79.
169. See id. at 474.
170. Id. at 478. The court also held that "[i]ntentional close proximity sniffing of the person
is offensive whether the sniffer be canine or human." Id. at 479.
171. See id. at 477.
172. See id. at 488.
173. 681 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Va. 1987).
174. See id. at 1164.
175. See id. Interestingly, the court did not discuss whether the detention of the student
for the purpose of sniffing his hands was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment which
required reasonable suspicion as prescribed by the Court in T.L.O.
176. See, e.g., In re PatrickY., 723 A.2d 523, 528 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Commonwealth
v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1366 (Mass. 1992).
177. 515 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
178. See id. at 985. Nevertheless, the court held that the assistant principal had reasonable
suspicion to search the student's locker. See id. at 986.
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"any special restrictions with regard to the nature of the items
which could be stored in the locker," or that the students had been
notified "that use of the lockers would be subject to random or
periodic inspection or search."'79 The court in State v. Joseph T.
180
similarly noted that the West Virginia Board of Education handbook
provided that students "may reasonably expect that their lockers
will not be searched unless appropriate school officials consider a
search absolutely necessary to maintain the integrity of the school
environment and to protect other students."'81
Other courts, however, have held that students do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their lockers. Since school
lockers are generally the property of the school, these courts have
found that schools have a right to control and search them.'82 In
fact, the courts in these cases often do not even consider an
inspection of a student's locker to be a "search" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. 8 ' In Isiah B. v. State," for example, the
random search of a student's locker by a school official looking for a
gun was entirely permissible.8 5
IV. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CONCERNS ABOUT DUE PROCESS
VIOLATIONS
In addition to seeking relief under the Fourth Amendment,
students accused of violent activity may also challenge school
administrators for deprivations of property rights or liberty
interests without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 8 6 As states provide for public education and compel atten-
dance, students essentially have a property right in this
education.'87 This right, therefore, cannot be denied for misconduct
without provisions for fundamentally fair procedures to determine
179. Id. at 986 (Kelly, J., concurring).
180. 336 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1985).
181. Id. at 737 n.10.
182. See, e.g., People v. Overton, 249 N.E.2d 366, 368 (N.Y. 1969); Isiah B. v. State, 500
N.W.2d 637, 641 (Wis. 1993).
183. See, e.g., Isiah B. v. State, 500 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Wis. 1993).
184. 500 N.W.2d 637 (Wis. 1993).
185. See id. at 638.
186. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
187. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975) (noting that because a state statute
directed authorities to provide a free education to all residents of a certain age, the state was
in effect providing a property right).
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whether the misconduct has even occurred.'88 Students punished for
such conduct typically declare that imposition of discipline occurred
without proper notice and a hearing 89 or without notification of
their rights. 90
Suspension and expulsion are likely the most common disciplinary
measures for violent activity.'9 ' Suspension represents a temporary
leave from school, usually of not more than ten days. 92 Expulsion,
by implication, represents an extended period of time away from
school of greater than ten days.'93 The proper safeguards provided
to students sanctioned with such a punishment were first deter-
mined by the Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez,'94 where a state law
empowered school officials to suspend students for up to ten days
without providing a hearing prior to the suspension.'95 Students who
were punished under the rule and denied hearings challenged the
constitutionality of the law.'96 The Court held that suspension for up
to ten days implicated the property rights and liberty interests of
students.'97 Thus, prior to the imposition of sanctions, students are
entitled to receive oral or written notice of the charges, an opportu-
nity to hear the evidence against them, and an opportunity to be
heard.' The Court noted that both the notice and the hearing could
occur within "minutes" of the misconduct.'99 If this is not feasible,
then notice and a hearing should take place as soon as practica-
ble. 200 In any case, however, a hearing need only be an "informal
give-and-take" between the student and the school official.20'
188. See id. at 574 ("Having chosen to extend the right to an education... [the state] may
not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to
determine whether the misconduct has occurred.").
189. See, e.g., id. at 567; Draper v. Columbus Pub. Sch., 760 F. Supp. 131, 131-32 (S.D.
Ohio 1991).
190. See, e.g., Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882,883 (10th Cir. 1989); Boynton v. Casey, 543
F. Supp. 995, 996-97 (D. Me. 1982).
191. See Philip T.K. Daniel & Karen Bond Coriell, Suspension and Expulsion in America's
Public Schools: Has Unfairness Resulted from a Narrowing of Due Process?, 13 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 7 (1992).
192. See id. at 11.
193. See id. at 7.
194. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
195. See id. at 567.
196. See id. at 568-69.
197. See id. at 573-74.
198. See id. at 581.
199. Id. at 582.
200. See id. at 582-83.
201. Id. at 584.
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As Goss pertained only to short-term suspensions not exceeding
ten days, a more severe punishment, according to the Court,
"[might] require more formal procedures."2 °2 This issue was
addressed in subsequent court cases. In Draper v. Columbus Public
Schools, °3 for example, a district court provided that in order to
determine the requirements of procedural due process for a student
who has been expelled, the student's interest in reputation and
uninterrupted education had to be balanced against the state's
interest in maintaining safe, orderly, and effective public schools. 20 4
In this way, procedural protections should be determined on a case-
by-case basis, as is demanded by the particular circumstances.2 5
The court thus held that due process requirements for expelling a
student who allegedly threatened other students with a knife, and
who was then reassigned to another school, were satisfied by an
informal hearing before the principal; written notice sent to his
parents informing them of his formal hearing before an officer of the
school system superintendent; the right to appeal to the school
board; the right to a formal written record of the hearing; and the
right to have legal counsel present.20 6
As a general rule, notice and a hearing should precede removal of
a student from school. However, students involved in violent activity
are not entitled to immediate due process protection if the student's
presence on or around campus poses a continuing danger to staff or
other students.20 7 In other words, the notice and hearing ordinarily
required can be temporarily delayed. The student can be removed
immediately from any school function or activity with due process
procedures to be followed as soon thereafter as is reasonable.0 8
Courts have customarily followed this "dangerousness" exception
202. Id.
203. 760 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
204. See id. at 133. This balancing formula derives fromMorrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (holding that the interests of a parolee must be balanced against the interests of the
state in revoking parole).
205. See Draper, 760 F. Supp. at 133.
206. See id. at 134; see also Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460,467 (C.D. Cal. 1977)
("In an expulsion hearing, the notice given to the student must include a statement not only
of the specific charge, but also the basic rights to be afforded the student: to be represented
by counsel, to present evidence, and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.").
207. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 582.
208. See id.
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where students are suspected of trafficking drugs or possessing
dangerous weapons. °9
Schools that use only minor disciplinary actions in dealing with
gang activity are also unlikely to run into any due process problems.
For example, withholding participation in extracurricular activities
may not rise to the level of a constitutional violation of students'
rights. The Supreme Court has ruled that student participation in
extracurricular activities is voluntary, and unlike compulsory
attendance, it carries little in the way of constitutional protection.210
As the punishment of nonparticipation is mild and often reversible
if the student later complies with the violated rule, any balancing of
rights among the parties usually weighs in favor of the school and
other students.
The other frequent challenge on Fourteenth Amendment due
process grounds concerns the limits on interrogations of students.
A complication can arise when, without having been informed of
their right to remain silent, students are questioned for the purpose
of uncovering a crime or criminal activity. The limitations on school
interrogations, however, are not as strict as those in law enforce-
ment, presumably because the goal is not to elucidate confessions,
but to preserve order on campus.21" '
As such, a twenty-minute interrogation by a school official to
determine whether a student had made a bomb threat did not
deprive the student of a due process property right or liberty
interest when two other students had implicated him. 2 ' Similarly,
in Boynton v. Casey,2" 3 a federal district court found that due process
requirements were met during the proceedings that resulted in a
student's suspension and expulsion because the student had not
been subjected to a "custodial interrogation" by school officials,
209. See, e.g., Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 921 (6th Cir. 1988)
(discussing marijuana trafficking); Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260,261 (5th
Cir. 1985) (discussing possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia).
210. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).
211. See Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, 997 (D. Me. 1982) ("[The Court can find [no
authority] supporting an extension of the Miranda rule ... to interrogations conducted by
school officials in furtherance of their disciplinary duties." (citation omitted) (footnote
omitted)).
212. See Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882, 885-86 (10th Cir. 1989).
213. 543 F. Supp. 995 (D. Me. 1982).
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although he was held for questioning and had not been permitted to
leave.214
V. CONCLUSION
Public school students should feel and be safe at school. They
should be free from violence by other students as well as from
unreasonable invasions of privacy and regulations of individuality
by school officials. The current state of constitutional law as applied
in the school setting, however, seems to require one at the expense
of the other.
It appears, therefore, that a dress code calling for uniforms will be
upheld as constitutional by the courts. When the Fourth Amend-
ment applies, schools will rarely be unable to establish the existence
of reasonable suspicion to search and seize. Due process consider-
ations for students will be relaxed. Courts, foreseeably, will defer all
authority to school boards and administrators regarding the
disciplining and care of students, and such a trend appears to be in
line with the current educational climate. Certainly, with the
accelerated incidence of drugs, weapons, and even explosives
entering public schools today, it is highly probable that this trend
will accelerate as well. The result, however, will be a weakening of
individual student rights. Arguably, it is already underway; very
few cases of late favor the student-complainant.
Because of the importance of assuring a safe school atmosphere
as well as proper student discipline, school officials will continue to
employ the necessary means to detect, and to deter, misconduct.
Students' constitutional rights, however, albeit minimal, will
continue to exist. This accommodation of competing interests will
allow school personnel the flexibility to maintain a stable learning
environment, but it must demand that they be respectful of stu-
dents' civil rights as well.
Jennifer L. Barnes
214. See id. at 997.
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